BRLY-2022-040

The stack memory contents leak / information disclosure vulnerability in DXE driver.

Public Disclosure Date: Nov 16, 2023

CVE ID

CVE-2023-22356

Vendors Affected

Intel

Products Affected

Intel NUC M15 / BCTGL357 v0077 (Latest)

Summary

BINARLY efiXplorer team has discovered a stack memory contents leak / information disclosure vulnerability that allows a potential attacker to write stack memory to NVRAM variable.

Potential Impact

An attacker with local privileged access can exploit this vulnerability to read the contents of the stack and use this information to exploit other vulnerabilities in DXE. A malicious code installed as a result of the vulnerability exploitation in a DXE driver could survive across an operating system (OS) boot process and runtime or modify NVRAM area on SPI flash storage (to gain persistence on target platform). Additionally, this vulnerability potentially could be used by threat actors to bypass OS security mechanisms (modify privileged memory or runtime variables), influence on the OS boot process, and in some cases would allow an attacker to hook or modify EFI Runtime services.

Vulnerability Information

BINARLY internal vulnerability identifier: BRLY-2022-040
Intel PSIRT assigned CVE identifier: CVE-2023-22356
Intel advisory: INTEL-SA-00917
CVSS v3.1: 6.0 Medium AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Table of Contents

01.Affected Intel firmware confirmed to be impacted by Binarly team

02.Vulnerability description

03.Disclosure timeline

04.Acknowledgements

Affected Intel firmware confirmed to be impacted by Binarly team

Device/Firmware	File Name	SHA256 (File PE32 section)	File GUID
Intel NUC M15 / BCTGL357 v0077 (Latest)	AMITSE	4c684ca2b4c09bb33e106399757c6d21f2fc511f71146b48bde03ef36c2259b6	B1DA0ADF-4F77-4070-A88E-BFFE1C60529A
Intel NUC M15 / BCTGL357 v0077 (Latest)	-	7120c9acef8194c2ca1a746745432b04ba6b87e950113fe413c5f26c8f7d61c0	A2DF5376-C2ED-49C0-90FF-8B173B0FD066

Vulnerability description

The vulnerability exists in the function located at offset 0xF02C.

__int64 sub_F02C()
{
  __int64 result;
  UINTN DataSize;
  __int64 Data;
  EFI_GUID VendorGuid;
  EFI_GUID BootFlowVariableGuid;
  UINT32 Attributes;
  UINT32 OsIndicationsAttributes;
  int BootFlowValue;
  __int64 OsIndicationsValue;

  sub_503C(0, 0, 0x18, 0x50);

  // EFI_SIMPLE_BOOT_FLAG_VARIABLE_GUID
  VendorGuid.Data1 = 0x8BE4DF61;
  *&VendorGuid.Data2 = 0x11D293CA;
  *VendorGuid.Data4 = 0xE0000DAA;
  *&VendorGuid.Data4[4] = 0x8C2B0398;

  Data = 1;
  DataSize = 8;
  Attributes = 6;
  BootFlowValue = 4;

  // BOOT_FLOW_VARIABLE_GUID
  BootFlowVariableGuid.Data1 = 0xEF152FB4;
  *&BootFlowVariableGuid.Data2 = 0x427D7B2F;
  *BootFlowVariableGuid.Data4 = 0xA7EB4BD;
  *&BootFlowVariableGuid.Data4[4] = 0x646E8205;
  if ( (gRT->GetVariable(L"OsIndicationsSupported", &VendorGuid, &Attributes, &DataSize, &Data) & 0x8000000000000000) == 0
    && DataSize )
  {
    Data |= 1;
  }
  result = gRT->SetVariable(L"OsIndicationsSupported", &VendorGuid, Attributes, DataSize, &Data);
  if ( result >= 0 )
  {
    DataSize = 8;
    result = gRT->GetVariable(L"OsIndications", &VendorGuid, &OsIndicationsAttributes, &DataSize, &OsIndicationsValue);
    if ( result >= 0 && (OsIndicationsValue & 1) != 0 )
    {
      gRT->SetVariable(L"BootFlow", &BootFlowVariableGuid, 2, 4, &BootFlowValue);
      OsIndicationsValue &= ~1;
      return gRT->SetVariable(L"OsIndications", &VendorGuid, OsIndicationsAttributes, DataSize, &OsIndicationsValue);
    }
  }
  return result;
}

Consider the following code snippet:

DataSize = 8;
if ( (gRT->GetVariable(L"OsIndicationsSupported", &VendorGuid, &Attributes, &DataSize, &Data) & 0x8000000000000000) == 0
  && DataSize )
{
  Data |= 1;
}
result = gRT->SetVariable(L"OsIndicationsSupported", &VendorGuid, Attributes, DataSize, &Data);

As we can see from the pseudocode, for the OsIndicationsSupported variable gRT->SetVariable() service is called with the DataSize value, which can be overwritten inside the gRT->GetVariable() service.

Thus, a potential attacker can write X - 8 bytes from the stack to NVRAM if writes any buffer of length X > 8 to the OsIndicationsSupported NVRAM variable before next system boot.

In order to fix this vulnerability, the DataSize variable must be initialized before gRT->SetVariable().

Disclosure timeline

This vulnerability is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapsed or a patch has been made broadly available (whichever is earlier), the vulnerability report will become visible to the public.

Disclosure Activity	Date (YYYY-MM-dd)
Intel PSIRT is notified	2022-12-19
Intel PSIRT assigned CVE number	2023-02-28
Intel PSIRT provide patch release	2023-08-08
BINARLY public disclosure date	2023-11-16

Acknowledgements

BINARLY efiXplorer team

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BRLY-2022-040

The stack memory contents leak / information disclosure vulnerability in DXE driver.

Public Disclosure Date: Nov 16, 2023

CVE ID

CVE-2023-22356

Vendors Affected

Intel

Products Affected

Intel NUC M15 / BCTGL357 v0077 (Latest)

Summary

BINARLY efiXplorer team has discovered a stack memory contents leak / information disclosure vulnerability that allows a potential attacker to write stack memory to NVRAM variable.

Potential Impact

Vulnerability Information

BINARLY internal vulnerability identifier: BRLY-2022-040
Intel PSIRT assigned CVE identifier: CVE-2023-22356
Intel advisory: INTEL-SA-00917
CVSS v3.1: 6.0 Medium AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Table of Contents

01.Affected Intel firmware confirmed to be impacted by Binarly team

02.Vulnerability description

03.Disclosure timeline

04.Acknowledgements

Affected Intel firmware confirmed to be impacted by Binarly team

Device/Firmware	File Name	SHA256 (File PE32 section)	File GUID
Intel NUC M15 / BCTGL357 v0077 (Latest)	AMITSE	4c684ca2b4c09bb33e106399757c6d21f2fc511f71146b48bde03ef36c2259b6	B1DA0ADF-4F77-4070-A88E-BFFE1C60529A
Intel NUC M15 / BCTGL357 v0077 (Latest)	-	7120c9acef8194c2ca1a746745432b04ba6b87e950113fe413c5f26c8f7d61c0	A2DF5376-C2ED-49C0-90FF-8B173B0FD066

Vulnerability description

The vulnerability exists in the function located at offset 0xF02C.

__int64 sub_F02C()
{
  __int64 result;
  UINTN DataSize;
  __int64 Data;
  EFI_GUID VendorGuid;
  EFI_GUID BootFlowVariableGuid;
  UINT32 Attributes;
  UINT32 OsIndicationsAttributes;
  int BootFlowValue;
  __int64 OsIndicationsValue;

  sub_503C(0, 0, 0x18, 0x50);

  // EFI_SIMPLE_BOOT_FLAG_VARIABLE_GUID
  VendorGuid.Data1 = 0x8BE4DF61;
  *&VendorGuid.Data2 = 0x11D293CA;
  *VendorGuid.Data4 = 0xE0000DAA;
  *&VendorGuid.Data4[4] = 0x8C2B0398;

  Data = 1;
  DataSize = 8;
  Attributes = 6;
  BootFlowValue = 4;

  // BOOT_FLOW_VARIABLE_GUID
  BootFlowVariableGuid.Data1 = 0xEF152FB4;
  *&BootFlowVariableGuid.Data2 = 0x427D7B2F;
  *BootFlowVariableGuid.Data4 = 0xA7EB4BD;
  *&BootFlowVariableGuid.Data4[4] = 0x646E8205;
  if ( (gRT->GetVariable(L"OsIndicationsSupported", &VendorGuid, &Attributes, &DataSize, &Data) & 0x8000000000000000) == 0
    && DataSize )
  {
    Data |= 1;
  }
  result = gRT->SetVariable(L"OsIndicationsSupported", &VendorGuid, Attributes, DataSize, &Data);
  if ( result >= 0 )
  {
    DataSize = 8;
    result = gRT->GetVariable(L"OsIndications", &VendorGuid, &OsIndicationsAttributes, &DataSize, &OsIndicationsValue);
    if ( result >= 0 && (OsIndicationsValue & 1) != 0 )
    {
      gRT->SetVariable(L"BootFlow", &BootFlowVariableGuid, 2, 4, &BootFlowValue);
      OsIndicationsValue &= ~1;
      return gRT->SetVariable(L"OsIndications", &VendorGuid, OsIndicationsAttributes, DataSize, &OsIndicationsValue);
    }
  }
  return result;
}

Consider the following code snippet:

DataSize = 8;
if ( (gRT->GetVariable(L"OsIndicationsSupported", &VendorGuid, &Attributes, &DataSize, &Data) & 0x8000000000000000) == 0
  && DataSize )
{
  Data |= 1;
}
result = gRT->SetVariable(L"OsIndicationsSupported", &VendorGuid, Attributes, DataSize, &Data);

Thus, a potential attacker can write X - 8 bytes from the stack to NVRAM if writes any buffer of length X > 8 to the OsIndicationsSupported NVRAM variable before next system boot.

In order to fix this vulnerability, the DataSize variable must be initialized before gRT->SetVariable().

Disclosure timeline

Disclosure Activity	Date (YYYY-MM-dd)
Intel PSIRT is notified	2022-12-19
Intel PSIRT assigned CVE number	2023-02-28
Intel PSIRT provide patch release	2023-08-08
BINARLY public disclosure date	2023-11-16

Acknowledgements

BINARLY efiXplorer team

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Potential Impact

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Vulnerability Information

Image preview

Affected Intel firmware confirmed to be impacted by Binarly team

Image preview

Vulnerability description

Image preview

Disclosure timeline

Image preview

Acknowledgements

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See if you are impacted now with our Firmware Vulnerability Scanner

Potential Impact

Image preview

Vulnerability Information

Image preview

Affected Intel firmware confirmed to be impacted by Binarly team

Image preview

Vulnerability description

Image preview

Disclosure timeline

Image preview

Acknowledgements

Image preview

See if you are impacted now with our Firmware Vulnerability Scanner