[BRLY-2021-020] SMM callout vulnerability in combined DXE//SMM on Fujitsu device (SMM arbitrary code execution).

Summary

BINARLY efiXplorer team identified a SMM callout in a Fujitsu device, which allows an attacker to access the System Management Mode and execute arbitrary code.

Vulnerability Information

BINARLY internal vulnerability identifier: BRLY-2021-020
CERT/CC assigned case number: VU#796611
Insyde PSIRT assigned CVE identifier: CVE-2020-27339
CVSS v3.1: 8.2 High AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected Fujitsu firmwares with confirmed impact by BINARLY team

Device name	Driver name	Driver SHA256	File GUID
Fujitsu LIFEBOOK E459/E449	IdeBusDxe	4b91d7456d48b897106f97d419426840ef3c62844797b21b4c46fb4628fbae58	69FD8E47-A161-4550-B01A-5594CEB2B2B2

Potential impact

An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to elevate privileges from ring 0 to ring -2, execute arbitrary code in System Management Mode - an environment more privileged than operating system (OS) and completely isolated from it. Running arbitrary code in SMM additionally bypasses SMM-based SPI flash protections against modifications, which can help an attacker to install a firmware backdoor/implant into the BIOS. Such a malicious firmware code in the BIOS could persist across operating system re-installs. Additionally, this vulnerability could potentially be used by threat actors to bypass security mechanisms provided by UEFI firmware (for example, Secure Boot and some types of memory isolation for hypervisors).

Vulnerability description

In the function at offset 0xEBC (image sha256: 4b91d7456d48b897106f97d419426840ef3c62844797b21b4c46fb4628fbae58), the child software System Management Interrupt (SWSMI) handler with the GUID 54c03d2d-5903-4dfb-88b7-fa7636be03d1 is registered:

if ( SmstIsNotNull() )
{
  Handle1 = 0;
  gBS_E738->InstallProtocolInterface(&Handle1, &ProprietaryProtocol_D8C0, EFI_NATIVE_INTERFACE, 0);
  gHandle = Handle;
  return gSmst_E718->SmiHandlerRegister(SmiHandler_1C10, &gSmiHandlerGuid, &DispatchHandle);
}

Find below the decompiled SWSMI handler code:

EFI_STATUS __fastcall SmiHandler_80000A14(
        EFI_HANDLE DispatchHandle,
        const void *Context,
        void *CommBuffer,
        UINTN *CommBufferSize)
{
  // [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]

  if ( !CommBuffer || !CommBufferSize )
    return 0;
  if ( *CommBuffer == 1 )
  {
    Buffer = 0;
    if ( gBS_8000C6E0->LocateHandleBuffer(
           ByProtocol,
           &EFI_ATA_PASS_THRU_PROTOCOL_GUID_8000BE10,
           0,
           &NoHandles,
           &Buffer) )
    {
      Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
    }
    else
    {
      gBS_8000C6E0->FreePool(Buffer);
      Buffer = 0;
      BufferSize = 0;
      v6 = gSmst_8000C718->SmmLocateHandle(
             ByProtocol,
             &EFI_ATA_PASS_THRU_PROTOCOL_GUID_8000BE10,
             0,
             &BufferSize,
             0);
      Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
      if ( v6 )
      {
        if ( v6 == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL )
        {
          gSmst_8000C718->SmmAllocatePool(EfiRuntimeServicesData, BufferSize, &Buffer);
          if ( !Buffer )
          {
            Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
            goto _WriteStatus;
          }
          v6 = gSmst_8000C718->SmmLocateHandle(
                 ByProtocol,
                 &EFI_ATA_PASS_THRU_PROTOCOL_GUID_8000BE10,
                 0,
                 &BufferSize,
                 Buffer);
        }
        else if ( v6 != EFI_NOT_FOUND )
        {
          goto _WriteStatus;
        }
      }
      if ( v6 == EFI_NOT_FOUND )
        v7 = 0;
      else
        v7 = BufferSize >> 3;
      gSmst_8000C718->SmmFreePool(Buffer);
      if ( v7 == NoHandles )
        goto LABEL_18;
      if ( !Handle )
      {
        Status = EFI_NOT_READY;
        goto _WriteStatus;
      }
      Status = sub_8000082C(1, Handle);
      if ( !Status || Status == EFI_ALREADY_STARTED )
      {
        result = gBS_8000C6E0->HandleProtocol(Handle, &EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID_8000BF00, &EfiLoadedImageProtocol);
        if ( result )
          return result;
        EfiLoadedImageProtocol->Unload = Unload;
        if ( !gBS_8000C6E0->LocateProtocol(&EFI_ACPI_SUPPORT_PROTOCOL_GUID_8000BE90, 0, &EfiAcpiSupport) )
        {
          v9 = 0;
          do
          {
            v10 = (EfiAcpiSupport->GetAcpiTable)(EfiAcpiSupport, v9, &Buffer, &v18, v17);
            if ( !v10 )
            {
              if ( *Buffer == 'PCAF' )
              {
                v10 = EFI_ABORTED;
                gFacpValue = *(Buffer + 19);
              }
              gBS_8000C6E0->FreePool(Buffer);
            }
            ++v9;
          }
          while ( !v10 );
        }
        goto _WriteStatus;
      }
      if ( Status == EFI_NOT_STARTED )
LABEL_18:
        Status = 0;
    }
  }
  else
  {
    Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
  }
_WriteStatus:
  *(CommBuffer + 4) = Status;
  return 0;
}

If CommBuffer and CommBufferSize pointers are not-NULL and the first DWORD from CommBuffer is equal to 0x01, the following code will be executed:

Buffer = 0;
if ( gBS_8000C6E0->LocateHandleBuffer(
        ByProtocol,
        &EFI_ATA_PASS_THRU_PROTOCOL_GUID_8000BE10,
        0,
        &NoHandles,
        (EFI_HANDLE **)&Buffer) )
{
  Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
}

Using services from EFI_BOOT_SERVICES (in this case LocateHandleBuffer()) inside a SW SMI handler is unsafe and may lead to arbitrary code execution in SMM.

In addition to this example, this SMI handler uses other services from the EFI_BOOT_SERVICES tables. See below the vulnerable code snippet from the sub_8000082C() function (SmiHandler_80000A14() -> sub_8000082C()):

EFI_STATUS __fastcall sub_8000082C(char a1, EFI_STATUS (__cdecl *a2)(EFI_ATA_PASS_THRU_PROTOCOL *This, UINT16 *Port))
{
  // [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]

  NoHandles = 0;
  Buffer = 0;
  v4 = gBS_8000C6E0->LocateProtocol(&EFI_LEGACY_BIOS_PROTOCOL_GUID_8000BE40, 0, &EfiLegacyBiosProtocol);
  v5 = byte_8000C6A8;
  if ( !v4 )
    v5 = 1;
  byte_8000C6A8 = v5;
  if ( !a1 )
    return 0;
  if ( !gBS_8000C6E0->LocateProtocol(&EFI_SMM_RUNTIME_PROTOCOL_GUID_8000BDE0, 0, &gEfiSmmRuntimeProtocol) )
    (gEfiSmmRuntimeProtocol->Method_0)(&EFI_SMM_RUNTIME_PROTOCOL_GUID_8000BDE0, 0, &gEfiSmmRuntimeProtocol);
  result = gBS_8000C6E0->LocateHandleBuffer(
             ByProtocol,
             &EFI_ATA_PASS_THRU_PROTOCOL_GUID_8000BE10,
             0,
             &NoHandles,
             &Buffer);
  ...
  return result;
}

To exploit this vulnerability is enough to:

overwrite the service address in the EFI_BOOT_SERVICES table with the shellcode address
trigger the SWSMI handler (SwSmi number is specified in UEFI ACPI table)

Disclosure timeline

This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapsed or a patch has been made broadly available (whichever is earlier), the bug report will become visible to the public.

Disclosure Activity	Date
Fujitsu PSIRT is notified	2021-09-10
Fujitsu PSIRT is confirmed issue	2021-09-14
CERT/CC created a case	2021-09-27
Insyde PSIRT assigned CVE number	2021-11-01
Insyde PSIRT provide patch release	2021-11-09
BINARLY public disclosure date	2022-02-01

Acknowledgements

BINARLY efiXplorer team

Research